VKI_ENOSYS and VKI_EOVERFLOW don't have the same generic values for mips32/64.
We need to define these values for every Linux arch.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.valgrind.org/valgrind/trunk@13852
Only check struct sigevent actually used by the kernel. If SIGEV_THREAD_ID
is set check sigev_notify_thread_id, otherwise don't.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.valgrind.org/valgrind/trunk@13835
This is new in Xen 4.4.
From: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.valgrind.org/valgrind/trunk@13738
From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.valgrind.org/valgrind/trunk@13737
From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.valgrind.org/valgrind/trunk@13736
And some of the sub-subops. It is a little hacky given the legacy way of
having several methods of enabling/disbling LOG_DIRTY mode.
From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.valgrind.org/valgrind/trunk@13735
Xen reads 'num' and the 'array' pointer from ARG1, and proceeds to read and
modify-in-place the entire userspace array.
From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.valgrind.org/valgrind/trunk@13733
The semantics of XEN_DOMCTL_gethvmcontext are little interesting.
If the 'buffer' field of the structure is NULL, the hypercall is a request for
the required buffer size, which written into the 'size' paramater.
If 'buffer' is non NULL, Xen will write to the buffer, and update 'size' with
the amount of data written.
From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.valgrind.org/valgrind/trunk@13732
Xen reads the entire structure and writes nothing.
From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.valgrind.org/valgrind/trunk@13731
Xen reads the entire structure, and if the space is _gmfn, will write the
structure back
From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.valgrind.org/valgrind/trunk@13730
The XENMEM_machphys_mfn_list implementation reads 'max_extents' and
'extents_start'. It writes to the array at 'extents_start', and writes the
number of extents written into the 'nr_extents' field.
From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.valgrind.org/valgrind/trunk@13729
and an implementation of XEN_TMEM_control save_begin.
Xen will read various fields at various time, but write nothing back for a
save_begin subop.
From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.valgrind.org/valgrind/trunk@13726
From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Also add a default case so future bumps of the sysctl interface version dont
result in spurious passes of the IOCTL handler.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.valgrind.org/valgrind/trunk@13725
Bug #320116. sockaddr_rc might contain some padding which might not be
initialized. Explicitly check the sockaddr_rc fields are set. That also
produces better diagnostics about which field is unitialized.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.valgrind.org/valgrind/trunk@13404
Enable wrappers for syscalls prlimit64, process_vm_readv, process_vm_writev,
needed by the following tests:
- none/tests/rlimit64_nofile and
- none/tests/process_vm_readv_writev.
The change also adds definitions for several system calls for MIPS64.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.valgrind.org/valgrind/trunk@13400
This change removes option to define shared-memory-alignment for MIPS,
instead default value (0x40000) from MIPS Linux kernel will be used.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.valgrind.org/valgrind/trunk@13389
MIPS uses different values for socket types.
This is protected by ARCH_HAS_SOCKET_TYPES in Linux kernel and we introduce
it here too. This is important for log-socket feature, and it resolves the
issue reported in https://bugs.kde.org/show_bug.cgi?id=313267#c21.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.valgrind.org/valgrind/trunk@13359
Necessary changes to Valgrind to support MIPS64LE on Linux.
Minor cleanup/style changes embedded in the patch as well.
The change corresponds to r2687 in VEX.
Patch written by Dejan Jevtic and Petar Jovanovic.
More information about this issue:
https://bugs.kde.org/show_bug.cgi?id=313267
git-svn-id: svn://svn.valgrind.org/valgrind/trunk@13292
From: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com>
Under Xen the toolstack is responsible for managing the domains in
the system, e.g. creating, destroying, and otherwise manipulating
them.
To do this it uses a number of ioctls on the /proc/xen/privcmd
device. Most of these (the MMAPBATCH ones) simply set things up such
that a subsequenct mmap call will map the desired guest memory. Since
valgrind has no way of knowing what the memory contains we assume
that it is all initialised (to do otherwise would require valgrind to
be observing the complete state of the system and not just the given
process).
The most interesting ioctl is XEN_IOCTL_PRIVCMD_HYPERCALL which
allows the toolstack to make arbitrary hypercalls. Although the
mechanism here is specific to the OS of the guest running the
toolstack the hypercalls themselves are defined solely by the
hypervisor. Therefore I have split support for this ioctl into a part
in syswrap-linux.c which handles the ioctl itself and passes things
onto a new syswrap-xen.c which handles the specifics of the
hypercalls themselves. Porting this to another OS should just be a
matter of wiring up syswrap-$OS.c to decode the ioctl and call into
syswrap-xen.c. In the future we may want to split this into
syswrap-$ARCH-xen.c but for now this is x86 only.
The hypercall coverage here is pretty small but is enough to get
reasonable(-ish) results out of the xl toolstack when listing,
creating and destroying domains.
One issue is that the hypercalls which are exlusively used by the
toolstacks (as opposed to those used by guest operating systems) are
not considered a stable ABI, since the hypervisor and the lowlevel
tools are considered a matched pair. This covers the sysctl and
domctl hypercalls which are a fairly large chunk of the support
here. I'm not sure how to solve this without invoking a massive
amount of duplication. Right now this targets the Xen unstable
interface (which will shortly be released as Xen 4.2), perhaps I can
get away with deferring this problem until the first change .
On the plus side the vast majority of hypercalls are not of interest
to the toolstack (they are used by guests) so we can get away without
implementing them.
Note: a hypercall only reads as many words from the ioctl arg
struct as there are actual arguments to that hypercall and the
toolstack only initialises the arguments which are used. However
there is no space in the DEFN_PRE_TEMPLATE prototype to allow this to
be communicated from syswrap-xen.c back to syswrap-linux.c. Since a
hypercall can have at most 5 arguments I have hackily stolen ARG8 for
this purpose.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.valgrind.org/valgrind/trunk@12963
